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Each institutional arrangement in a financial system has 
both advantages and disadvantages in mobilizing savings, 
allocating capital, diversifying risks, and processing 
information when facilitating financial transactions. 
Meanwhile, the factor endowment in an economy at 
each stage of its development determines the optimal 
industrial structure in the real sector, which in turn 
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constitutes the main determinant of the size distribution 
and risk features of viable enterprises with implications 
for the appropriate institutional arrangement of financial 
services at that stage. Therefore, there is an endogenously 
determined optimal financial structure for the economy 
at each stage of development.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
Finance is playing an increasingly significant role in modern economies. The current global 
financial crisis calls for improving domestic as well as international financial regulations and 
supervisions. The paper attempts to bring attention to the structure of the financial system in a 
country.  The financial structure varies across countries. Understanding the difference in 
financial structure and how it is related to economic development can provide policy 
implications for many countries, especially those developing countries which are making 
efforts to strengthen their financial system. Financial economists have debated the relative 
importance of banks and financial markets in a financial system for decades. There is also a 
vast body of literature devoted to analyzing the relative advantages of various banking 
structures. But taken as a whole, the existing research has not reached an agreement on the 
strengths and weaknesses of various types of financial structure in promoting economic 
growth. Trying to provide a new perspective in clarifying our understanding of the 
relationship between financial structure and economic development, we propose in this paper 
a theoretical hypothesis that ‘the optimal financial structure in an economy depends on its 
stage of economic development.’   
 
The demands for most financial services are derived from the demands for serving the needs 
of real economy. However, the existing studies usually start from analyzing characteristics of 
various financial institutional arrangements and then discuss possible impacts of different 
financial structures upon economic performance in an economy. Since each financial 
arrangement has its own advantages and disadvantages in mobilizing savings, allocating 
funds, and diversifying risks, it is not surprising that the literature is not able to decide on 
what type of financial structure is most beneficial to economic development. We believe that 
it is necessary to study both the specific nature of real sector at different stages of 
development and the nature of various institutional arrangements in the financial system in 
order to sharpen our understanding of the relationship between them in the process of 
economic development. However, characteristics of the real economy have not been given 
enough attention in the literature on financial structure.   2 
 
 
The main idea of this paper is as follows: An economy at each stage of its development has a 
given specific structure of factor endowment
1, which endogenously determines its optimal 
industrial structure at that stage. Enterprises operating in different industries are distinct in 
terms of firm size, risk, and financing needs. Thus the demand of the real economy for 
financial services at some development stages can be systemically different from that of the 
same economy at other stages. Only when the characteristics of financial structure match 
those of the industrial structure in the economy, can the financial system efficiently perform 
its fundamental functions and contribute to sustainable and inclusive economic development. 
Therefore, there exists some optimal financial structure for the economy at each of its 
development stages. A deviation of the financial structure from its optimal path will lead to 
low efficiency of the financial system and hinder economic development. While poor 
regulation and supervision may cause financial crisis, serious mismatch between the financial 
structure and industrial structure may also cause financial crises. 
 
The rest of this paper consists of four sections. Section II defines “financial structure” used in 
this paper and summarizes the related literature; section III elaborates the main arguments of 
optimal financial structure; section IV discusses some policy implications of the theory; 
section V concludes. 
 
II. Financial Structure and Economic Development: A Brief Literature Review 
 
II.1 Definition of financial structure 
 
We define “financial structure” as the composition and relative importance of various 
financial institutional arrangements in a financial system
2. This is a very general definition. 
Financial structure can be investigated from several dimensions depending on the purpose of 
                                                        
1  Factor endowment structure is defined as the relative abundance of various factors of production, mainly labor, 
capital, and natural resources. 
2  The definition of “financial structure” is more general in this paper than that in the literature. As we shall see in 
the next subsection, financial structure in existing literature usually refers to the relative importance of financial 
markets and financial intermediaries, which is only one dimension of our definition of “financial structure”.       3 
 
the research. For instance, in order to examine the channels of financial intermediation, the 
relative importance of financial intermediaries and financial markets will be the focus. In 
terms of long-term or short-term financing, the composition of monetary markets and capital 
markets is important. For the discussion of government regulation, the distinction and 
composition of formal finance and informal finance are of relevance. In the banking sector, 
we may want to analyze the distribution of big banks and small banks.         
 
This paper focuses on two dimensions of financial structure: (1) the relative importance of 
banks and financial markets; and (2) the distribution of banks of difference sizes. We believe 
that financial structure along these two dimensions critically affects the efficiency of the 
financial system in performing its fundamental functions in the process of economic 
development. Banks are the typical type of financial intermediaries and have very different 
mechanisms from financial markets in mobilizing savings, allocating capital, and diversifying 
risks. The relative importance of banks and markets constitutes the most important dimension 
of financial structure. Meanwhile, there is an obvious distinction between the way in which 
big banks do businesses and how small banks operate, which has implications for access to 
services, especially lending services, by different sizes of firms. Thus the distribution of big 
banks and their smaller counterparts can have a significant effect on the performance of the 
banking  sector.   
 
II. 2 Financial structure and economic development: A brief literature review 
 
This subsection summarizes the literature related to the relationship between financial 
structure (as defined in the above subsection) and economic development.   
 
II.2.1      Market-based vs. bank-based financial structure 
One of the two established facts about the relative importance of financial markets and banks 
and its relationship with economic development is that financial markets tend to be more 
active relative to banks in countries with higher income per capita (Goldsmith, 1969; 4 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2001; Lin et al, 2006)
1. The existing studies have concentrated on 
exploring the causal relationship between financial structure and economic growth, i.e., 
whether market-based or bank-based financial structure is better for economic growth
2. As 
Levine (2005) summarizes, related arguments can be grouped into four views. Proponents of 
bank-based structure argue that banks and other financial intermediaries have advantages in 
collecting and processing information while financial markets provide much weaker 
incentives for agents to collect information ex ante and monitor borrowers (or stock issuers) 
ex post (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Stiglitz, 1985; Bhide, 1993; Allen and Gale, 2000; etc.). 
Thus financial markets are at a disadvantage in terms of alleviating informational asymmetry 
and therefore a financial system with a bank-based structure should perform better in 
allocating resources and promoting economic development. Correspondingly, those who favor 
market-based structure focus on the problems created by powerful banks. Bank-based systems 
may involve intermediaries that have huge influence over firms and this influence may 
damage economic growth (Rajan, 1992). Besides, banks tend to be more cautious by nature 
and so bank-based systems may stymie economic innovation and impede economic growth. 
Furthermore, financial markets can provide richer and flexible risk management tools for 
agents while banks can only provide basic risk management services. There are also some 
financial economists who reject the importance of distinguishing the financial system as 
bank-based or market-based but argue that markets and banks provide complementary 
services (Merton, 1995; Merton and Bodies, 1995). Finally, some studies hold the “law and 
finance” view which emphasizes the importance of the legal system in financial development, 
and that “distinguishing countries by the efficiency of national legal systems in supporting 
financial transactions is more useful than distinguishing countries by whether they have 
                                                        
1  The other established fact is that the level of financial development (usually measured by the ratio of the size of 
financial sector to that of GDP) is higher in countries with higher income per capita. 
2  While the concepts of “bank-based” and “market-based” financial structure are widely used in the literature, in 
our best knowledge there is no concise definition of these two types of financial structure. The generally accepted 
approach is to illustrate the distinction between them by comparing the financial systems in the U.S. and U.K. (as 
examples of market-based structure) to those in Germany and Japan (as examples of bank-based structure). 
However, the stock market in Japan is one the most advanced financial markets in the world while banks in the 
U.S and the U.K. are among the most active and sophisticated financial intermediaries. Therefore, if put in a global 
context, the comparison of the financial structure in Germany and Japan and that in the U.S. and U.K. is better 
described as “minor difference with major similarity”, but there is “major difference with minor similarity” 
between the financial structure in developing countries and that in developed countries. Thus it is necessary to pay 
more attention to the difference in financial structure in countries at different stages of economic development in 
order to fully understand the relationship between financial structure and economic development.         5 
 
bank-based or market-based financial systems”
1 (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Some 
empirical studies, such as Beck and Levine(2002), Demierguc-Kunt and Maksimovic(2002), 
and Levine(2003) etc., find results surprisingly consistent with the third and fourth views, 
showing that financial structure is not a first-order concern in understanding the process of 
economic growth after controlling for the level of financial development.     
 
II.2.2 Banking structure and economic development 
When it comes to banking structure, the literature mainly discusses whether competitive or 
monopolistic banking structure is better for economic growth. Traditional wisdom suggests 
that monopolistic banks may extract too much rent from firms, pay lower deposit interest 
rates, and thus lead to more severe credit rationing, which has very negative effects on 
economic growth. But some studies argue that monopolistic banks have more incentive to 
collect information, screen and monitor borrowers, and form long-term relationships with 
borrowers; therefore investment projects have more chances to get financed. In a competitive 
banking sector, borrowers can more easily shift between lenders, so banks may have less 
incentive and less capability to forge such long-term borrower-lender relationships. Such 
borrower-lender relationships are especially valuable to start-ups and new firms. Thus these 
studies suggest that monopolistic banking structure is beneficial to the establishment and 
growth of new firms. Empirical results in this area are far from conclusive. Some studies 
show that lower banking concentration leads to more new establishments and thus has 
positive implications for economic growth (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Cetorelli and 
Strahan, 2006; etc.; World Bank 2007). Others find that new firms grow faster in economies 
with a more concentrated banking sector but old firms benefit from a more competitive 
banking structure (Jackson and Thomson, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1995; etc.).       
 
II.2.3 Some comments 
It seems that the empirical results on the growth impacts of bank-based and market-based 
financial structure are inconclusive. The basic fact mentioned at the beginning of this 
subsection that financial markets tend to be more active relative to banks in countries with 
                                                        
1  Cited from Levine (2005). 6 
 
higher income per capita deserves further exploration both theoretically and empirically: if 
financial structure does not matter for economic growth after controlling the level of financial 
development, as some studies suggest, why is there the factual trend that financial markets 
become more active in richer countries? While the existing studies on banking structure have 
focused on banking concentration, the distribution of banks of different size has not caught 
enough attention of researchers. A well-established fact that small businesses, which are the 
dominant form of business operation in developing countries, usually have difficulties in 
obtaining loans from big banks suggests that bank size does matter for the allocation 
efficiency of the banking sector. In addition, it’s interesting that the above two bodies of 
literature developed independently while they address two different dimensions of the same 
question------how financial structure affects economic growth.     
 
But we also notice that the two parts of literature have adopted a similar research perspective. 
These studies usually start from examining the characteristics of various financial institutional 
arrangements and then discuss the possible effects of financial structure on economic 
development. To our understanding, the justification for this perspective may be that the 
specific question addressed in those studies is the effect of financial structure upon economic 
growth. However, this question may not be appropriately answered if it is separated from the 
question of how financial structure itself is determined.   
 
There is some research studying the mechanisms affecting the determination of financial 
structure. Rajan and Zingales (2003) apply interest group theory to explain the difference in 
financial structure in countries at a similar development stage. Some studies follow the 
foregone “law and finance” literature emphasizing the importance of the legal system in 
determining financial structure. They argue that legal protection of investors and the 
effectiveness in implementing the law are more critical for the operation of financial markets 
than for banks. Thus a bank-based financial system will have advantages in countries with a 
weak legal system. This logic, however, needs to explain some general observations: the level 
of financial development and financial structure are usually different in countries with a 
similar legal origin but at different development stages; the financial structure in the same 7 
 
country also changes as the country’s economy develops.  Therefore, it is necessary to take 
into serious consideration the endogeneity of the financial structure when analyzing the 
relationship between financial structure and economic development. 
 
III. Optimal Financial Structure in Economic Development 
   
III.1 Characteristics of various financial institutional arrangements 
 
Each financial institutional arrangement specifies a set of rights and obligations of fund users 
and fund providers, exposes each party to certain risks, and entails some transaction costs. 
This subsection is dedicated to discussing the above characteristics of some key financial 
institutional  arrangements.           
 
III.1.1 Financial markets and banks 
One of the main forms of direct finance is equity financing. The issuer, typically some 
company, raises capital by issuing stocks to fund providers and the fund providers become 
shareholders of the issuing firm.  Proportionally to their ownership, shareholders have the 
right to share the issuer’s future profits although the return to shares is not specified in 
advance and thus uncertain. In the case of liquidation, shareholders are “residual claimers” 
whose rights to the firm’s assets are subordinate to creditors. Therefore, shareholders bear 
significant investment risk and thus are willing to invest only when they believe the 
investment is going to generate a high enough expected return. But by the same token, 
companies which are funded by issuing stocks do not face the risk of bankruptcy when they 
cannot distribute high enough dividends to their shareholders
1. In this sense, these companies 
face less risk of liquidation than if they were mainly financed by debts. In addition, in public 
equity issuing, the risk of the investment project is disseminated among many investors and 
thus each investor only bears a small share of the risk up to the amount of the fund invested. 
Stock markets where stocks are traded have also created flexible instruments and approaches 
                                                        
1  This analysis still holds despite the signaling effect of dividend as extensively studied in the corporate finance 
literature. 8 
 
for investors to diversify and manage idiosyncratic investment risk. 
 
While shareholders are usually granted the right to vote on important matters such as election 
of directors, it is impractical that all shareholders participate in the daily business of the 
company. Although directors and management have the duty to act in the best interest of 
shareholders, managers’ private interests may not align with that of shareholders and thus 
their decisions may not maximize firms’ market value. In widely held corporations where 
each shareholder owns a small stake in the firms, the classic issue of separation of ownership 
and control can be a serious concern (Berle and Means, 1932). To alleviate the agency 
problem in public companies, many countries’ governments regulate that equity issuers be 
audited and disclose information before the issue and afterwards
1. Since these “certification” 
expenses and information costs are very high and, at least to some extent, fixed, there is 
obvious economy of scale in equity financing. In this regard, smaller firms, which usually 
raise less capital, are at a disadvantage relative to their larger counterparts.   
 
On stock markets, investors update their information and make decisions individually and 
thus can agree to disagree on investment projects. For firms with new technologies or 
innovative projects, relevant information is often sparse and there is usually a diversity of 
opinions about these investments. Therefore, these types of firms are more likely to get 
funded through stock markets (Allen and Gale, 1999).         
 
                                                        
1  In addition to regulation of information disclosure, stock markets have developed some mechanisms to reduce 
the agency problem between managers and outside shareholders, such as contract clauses, concentration of 
ownership and large shareholders’ monitoring, “voting by foot” by small shareholders, takeover, etc. Shareholders, 
in principle, are supposed to exercise their rights as owners through shareholder meetings, but free-riding behavior 
among shareholders usually undermines the effectiveness of shareholder meetings. Concentration of equity 
ownership can mitigate the free-riding problem associated with widely held corporations. But this comes at cost. 
Some of the cost is the limited diversification that these large shareholders can achieve, other cost is related to the 
feasibility that large shareholders may divert resources of the firm at the expense of small shareholders (Zingales, 
1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Takeover provides another mechanism by which stock markets replace managers 
with insufficient performance and so impose effects on corporate governance (Jensen, 1988). However, the threat 
of takeover is not likely to be an effective control mechanism because of informational asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders, information spillover effect among potential bidders, and insider managers’ strategic actions 
deterring takeovers. Another mechanism is through shareholders’ vote with their dollars and the consequential rise 
and fall of stock prices. Firms that do not use resources efficiently will not be able to raise additional capital. But 
this mechanism can only be effective to the extent that future capital must be raised from the stock market, which 
is often not the case in reality. Besides, high liquidity on the stock markets may lead to myopia actions on the side 
of investors and harm the resources allocation (Bhide, 1993). In short, the available mechanisms for stockholders 
to exercise control over corporate managers are only limitedly effective. 9 
 
As one of the most important financial intermediaries, banks typically collect deposits and 
allocate capital with loan contracts. Due to the debt property of the deposit contract, banks 
must pay back their deposits together with interest rates specified ex ante when the deposits 
are due. By the same token, loans must be paid back to banks on the due dates. From the point 
of view of depositors, deposits at banks are generally safe except in extreme cases where the 
bank is bankrupt
1. Consequently, the return to bank deposits is usually lower than the 
expected return to stock investments.    From the point of view of borrowers, transaction costs 
through borrowing from banks can be lower than issuing equities on stock markets for two 
reasons. First, when borrowing from one or a few banks, they do not need to publicize 
information and so save on informational cost and other transaction costs. Also, due to the 
debt property of loans, the loan interest rates are usually lower than the expected returns to 
stocks, which means that the borrowing firms pay relatively lower capital cost than issuing 
equity. However, once the firms are not able to pay back their loan obligations and fail to 
renegotiate with banks, they have to face the risk of bankruptcy or even liquidation. In this 
sense, borrowing loans is a riskier approach of financing for firms. 
 
As specialized financial intermediaries, banks can save information costs by utilizing 
economies of scale in producing information about potential borrowers, screening investment 
alternatives, and monitoring firm managers after making loans (Boyd and Prescott, 1986; 
Diamond, 1984; Allen, 1990). Since banks can privatize the information they acquire and 
form long-term relationships with borrowers, they have stronger incentives than small 
shareholders on stock markets to research firms, managers, and market conditions, which 
have positive implications for allocation efficiency. Furthermore, powerful banks with close 
ties to firms can be more effective in exerting pressure on firms to repay their debts than 
atomistic markets (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). But like a double-edged sword, private 
information that banks acquire may give them so much power over firms that they can extract 
excessive rents from firms, which may reduce the efforts by the firms to undertake profitable 
and innovative investments (Rajan, 1992).   
                                                        
1  With explicit deposit insurance programs provided by many countries’ governments, bank deposits are still safe 
even when the bank is bankrupt, although there is often some cap of such insured deposits.   10 
 
 
As it comes to risk management, banks can also achieve some extent of risk diversification by 
pooling a large number of deposits and diversifying their investment portfolio in different 
projects. But investments by banks are more concentrated compared to portfolio investments 
on stock markets, which is exactly the reason why banks have advantages in information 
production. In light of size limits to their assets, banks’ capability for risk diversification is 
much more limited compared with the possibilities provided by stock markets. 
 
Due to the intrinsic feature of loans and limited capability of risk diversification, banks are 
more concerned about the low tail of the returns to borrowers’ investments. Thus banks may 
have an inherent preference toward prudence and tend to be more conservative in choosing 
investments. As a result, banks may tend to make loans to mature firms with steady cash 
flows instead of new firms which are more risky but often promise higher returns. 
Furthermore, as Allen and Gale (1999) argue, banks work better in the situation that there is 
sufficient information about projects and agreement on investment choices can be easily 
achieved, but do not work well where there is diversity of opinion about projects. Thus firms 
involved with new technologies and more uncertainties will find it hard to get finance from 
banks.    
 
In addition to issuing equity and borrowing from banks, companies can also issue corporate 
bonds to raise capital. Like in the case of public equity issuing, the government usually 
regulate that companies issuing corporate bonds should be audited by professional auditors. 
Thus bond issuers have to spend significant expenses on auditing, information disclosure, and 
bond marketing and selling. There are also economies of scale because a large part of these 
costs are fixed. Again, large companies are in a better position than smaller ones in taking 
advantage of economies of scale in bond issuing. Due to the debt property of bonds, 
companies issuing bonds have to face the risk of bankruptcy and liquidation when they fail to 
repay the bond capital and interest. It is much more difficult to renegotiate with a large 
number of bond holders than with a few banks in the case of default. Thus given the 
operational profitability of a company, issuing bonds is riskier for the company than 11 
 
borrowing from banks or issuing stocks. From the point of view of investors, investing in 
corporate bonds can be less risky than buying stocks because of the seniority of bonds in the 
case of firm bankruptcy, but it is riskier than bank deposits for the reasons that the bank can 
diversify its loans and corporate bonds usually lack government insurance that bank deposits 
enjoy implicitly or explicitly. Correspondingly, the expected return to corporate bonds is 
usually lower than that to stocks but higher than deposit interest rates.               
        
III.1.2   Large  and  small  banks 
Plenty of evidence shows that there exists a type of specialization based on bank size in the 
banking sector. Large banks tend to shy away from small businesses but rather focus on large 
businesses, while small banks specialize in lending to small businesses
1. This specialization 
suggests that the distribution of banks of different sizes can be an important dimension for our 
understanding of financial structure and economic development in addition to the mix of 
banks and financial markets. 
 
As we mentioned above, the size of banks affects their capability for risk diversification. 
Small banks with very limited assets cannot afford to make large loans; otherwise they would 
have to bear much higher risk resulting from concentrated investments. Thus small banks can 
only make small loans. Large banks have more capability to make large loans while achieving 
better risk diversification. Since the transaction cost for making a loan is, at least to some 
degree, independent of loan size, large banks understandably prefer making loans to large 
firms rather than small ones for transaction cost consideration.       
 
The specialization based on size is also because small banks and large banks have different 
comparative advantage in serving different types of enterprises. The difference is rooted in the 
agency problem within the bank and its influence on the efficiency of banks in producing and 
using information. Such agency problems can exist between owners and management, 
between bank officers at higher levels and the local staff of the bank. Due to organizational 
                                                        
1  Please see evidence in Nakamura(1994), Berger and Udell (1995, 1998), Jayaratne and Wolken(1999), etc.   
 12 
 
complexity, such agency problems can be more severe in large banks. There are two types of 
information that banks can collect and rely on to make loan decisions. One type is more 
standard and hard information, such as firms’ financial statements, which is easily 
communicated and verified among people. The other type is less standard and soft 
information, such as the ability and characters of firm managers, local market conditions, etc. 
In order to collect soft information, the lender often needs to keep closer contact or form a 
long-term relationship with the borrower. Furthermore, communication of such soft 
information between information collectors and others is often a tough task (Petersen, 2004). 
In large banks which are more organizationally complex, the authority to make lending 
decisions is often granted to bank officers at higher levels. Due to difficulty in the 
communication and verification of nonstandard information, these loan officers rely mainly 
on standard information. Expecting little reward to such efforts, local branch officers are 
discouraged from collecting soft information. Instead local bank officers in large banks have 
more incentive to collect hard information which is easily communicated to their supervisors. 
On the contrary, in small banks, where information collectors are often lending decision 
makers or close to lending officers, soft information can be more effectively transmitted and 
utilized. Thus small banks can provide more incentives for their local officers to collect soft 
information about borrowers
1  (Stein, 2002). The distinction between large and small banks in 
producing information can affect their choice of borrowers in a systematic way. Small 
businesses usually lack complete and audited financial statements, have a short credit history, 
and own less physical assets that can be pledged as collateral. The ability and characters of 
the owner or chief managers can exert more significant influence on the operation of small 
businesses. Therefore, banks lending to small businesses have to rely on soft information and 
small banks have advantages in this regard. In addition, it should be much easier for local 
small banks to observe and forge long-term relationships with small firms in the region
2. On 
the contrary, large banks prefer to do business with large firms which are able to provide more 
                                                        
1  Consistent with these discussions, empirical studies find that big banks make lending decisions in a way 
systemically different from small banks. Big banks rely on standard information such as firms’ formal financial 
statements to make loan decisions. Small banks depend more on qualitative information about borrowers acquired 
by the bank staff in their personal interactions with borrowers or by keeping exclusive relationships with borrowers 
(Cole et al, 2004; Berger et al, 2005).         
2  Please refer to Petersen and Rajan(1994) for the importance of lender-borrower relationship in small business 
lending. 13 
 
standard financial information and collateral and have a longer credit history that banks can 
investigate.
1   
 
III.2 Characteristics of firms 
 
As we see in the above subsection, each financial institutional arrangement has its advantages 
and disadvantages. Thus the composition of various financial institutional arrangements in the 
financial system will affect its efficiency in mobilizing savings, allocating capital, and 
redistributing risks. However, it is hardly convincing to argue that one regime of financial 
structure is superior to another without taking into serious consideration the characteristics of 
firms, which constitute the main demand for capital. This subsection analyzes the 
characteristics of firms in size and risk which, we believe, are two critical factors determining 
how firms finance their investments. 
 
III.2.1 The size of firms   
 
The size of firms matters for their financing choice because there are economies of scale in 
financial transactions. Some components of transaction costs that firms incur in raising capital, 
such as expenses spent on financial auditing, information disclosure, security marketing and 
selling, contract negotiation and implementation, etc. are fixed. Small firms usually raise a smaller 
amount of capital than large firms and thus are at a disadvantage in terms of average transaction 
cost per unit of capital raised (Lin and Li, 2001). Moreover, empirical evidence shows that 
economies of scale with different sources of financing are different. Public equity financing has 
substantial economies of scale, followed by public bond issuing
2. Large companies enjoy some 
economies of scale when borrowing from banks but much less than in the case of public equity or 
                                                        
1  The entry of foreign bank, the increase in competition among large banks and the improvements in risk 
assessment technology can increase the large banks’ services to medium-size and even small-size enterprises in 
developing countries (World Bank 2007, de la Torre 2008). However, the basic picture is not changed. The 
extension of large banks’ lending to SMEs still remains quite limited although other types of services increased 
substantially. The majority of smaller enterprises at the bottom of the pyramid of firms by size still have no access 
to bank loans. 
2  Many empirical studies show that the costs of raising capital through IPO or SEO are very high and the ratio of 
direct and indirect costs to proceeds in IPO and SEO is much higher for smaller issues (Chen and Ritter, 2000; Lee, 
Lockhead, Ritter, and Zhao, 1996; Kaserer and Kraft, 2003 ).     14 
 
bond financing.   
 
The distinction in transaction costs with respect to different financial arrangements may be 
related to legal requirements or regulations, but more fundamentally it can be attributed to the 
different extents to which financial transactions are subjected to informational asymmetry 
under different financial arrangements. As we analyzed earlier, informational asymmetry is 
more severe in public equity or bond issuing than in intermediated borrowing. Big companies 
usually have standard financial documents and a longer financial history and thus are able to 
raise capital on financial markets. But small firms often lack such standard information, 
which makes them more opaque than big companies and so small firms suffer from more 
severe informational asymmetry on financial markets. Thus small firms are less likely to raise 
capital through public financial markets, and they have to pay higher costs if they are able to 
do so. Except for those with very high risk and expected investment returns as in the 
high-tech industries, small firms typically rely upon banks for external finance (Berger and 
Udell, 1998). Furthermore, as we discussed in the last subsection, small business lending 
relies more on soft information about firms and thus small firms have to depend on small 
local banks to finance their investments.       
         
III.2.2 The risk of firms   
To the extent that investors are risk averse, the risk characteristics of firms are key factors 
determining their financing choices. Given the macro-economic environment, the 
idiosyncratic risk of a firm can be decomposed into three components based on risk sources: 
technological innovation risk, product innovation risk, and entrepreneurship risk.
1  
                                                        
1  The entrepreneurship risk refers to the entrepreneur’s ability in managing and operating the firm, which are not 
directly observable to outside fund providers. The distinction between technological innovation risk and product 
innovation risk is crucial in studying the financial system in advance economies. For early-stage firms in high-tech 
industries, venture capital acts as the main financier for the firms’ R&D activities. Venture capital firms typically 
comprise small teams with technology backgrounds such as scientists and researchers and those with rich industry 
experience. With expert knowledge and industry experience, venture capitalists are able to identify novel ideas 
with high commercial potential and make sound judgments about the probability of success of the firm’s R&D. By 
this way, venture capitalists can reduce the technological innovation risk facing them. After the success of firms’ 
technological R&D, they need larger amount of capital to finance the production and marketing of their new 
products and to support the firms’ expansion. For firms at this stage of growth, IPOs on NASDAQ are often the 
main financing channel so as to diversify the firms’ product innovation risk. Such distinction between 
technological innovation risk and product innovation risk is not so important for developing economies whose 
industry and technology are far from the world frontier. For firms in these economies, technological innovation 
risk and product innovation risk are less distinctive. As we will elaborate below, if firms in developing economies 15 
 
 
The first component of firm risk is attributed to the firm’s technological innovation activities 
and thus depends mainly on the technological characteristics of the industry in which the firm 
operates. If the firm operates in some new industry it generally has to invest more intensively 
in R&D activities. Due to the inherent uncertainty of R&D, the firm is subject to more risk. If 
the firm operates in a mature industry and applies mature technologies, its technological 
innovation risk will be lower. Product innovation risk concerns the possibility that consumers 
may not accept the firm’s new product. This type of risk facing the firm depends not only on 
the firm’s marketing strategies and the related market competition but also on its novelty. It 
takes consumers more time to search and digest relevant information about brand new 
products. Thus for a firm operating in some new industry, even its R&D succeeds, its new 
products may not be easily accepted by the market and thus has higher product innovation 
risk. However, if a firm operates in a mature industry, its product faces less uncertainty on the 
market as long as its product is competitive relative to similar products. Entrepreneurship risk 
of a firm comes from uncertainty about the firm managers’ ability in operating and managing 
the firm.   
 
These three ingredients contribute to all firms’ risk, but their weights in the firm’s overall risk 
vary greatly for firms in different industries and different stages of development. This has 
important implication for the efficiency of alternative financial institutions in reducing 
informational asymmetry and risk sharing. For some firms with mature technology and 
products, uncertainties around managers’ ability is the major source of firms’ risk, then 
investors can collect historical information about the firms and their managers to make 
judgments about the firms’ future prospects. Both banks and financial markets have 
developed some mechanisms to collect historical information and to screen and oversee firm 
managers. Which financial institutional arrangements perform better in dealing with these 
firms depending on firm size and transaction costs. For firms operate in new industries, in 
addition to entrepreneurship risk, technological innovation and product innovation ingredients 
play a prominent role in these firms’ risk. Since available information related to firms’ 
                                                                                                                                                               
follow the economies’ comparative advantages, these two components of risk are very low 16 
 
prospects is sparse, investors are hardly able to obtain enough information to form robust 
judgments, then risk sharing and diversification through financial markets will be more 
important for investors to finance these firms
1. 
 
III.3. Factor endowments, optimal industrial structures   
and optimal financial structures 
 
III.3.1 Factor endowments, optimal industrial structure, and characteristics of firms   
In an open and competitive market, the relative abundance of endowments of various 
production factors, namely labor, capital, and natural resources, determines their relative 
prices, which in turn determine the costs of alternative production activities. If an economy is 
endowed with more abundant labor and relatively scarce capital, industries using 
labor-intensive technologies enjoy comparative cost advantages. Similarly, if capital is 
relatively abundant and labor is relatively scarce in the economy, industries with 
capital-intensive technologies will have comparative cost advantages. The optimal industrial 
structure in a market economy, therefore, reflects and is determined by its endowment 
structure of production factors. When its endowment structure changes
2 and so as well the 
relative prices of production factors, the optimal industrial structure will change 




                                                        
1  NASDAQ was established in the United States in the 1970s and has expanded together with venture capital in 
the past decades. This is an endogenous institutional change in the U.S. financial system to meet the challenge in 
financing small high-tech firms in the U.S. economy rather than an accidental phenomenon or an intentional 
design by the government.     
2  Since capital is usually accumulated at a faster rate than the growth of labor force and natural resources, the 
endowment structure of an economy tends to be more capital abundant as the economy develops. This process is 
referred to as “upgrading of endowment structure” in Lin (2003) and Lin (2009). 
3  The development of Japan after the WWII is an example. In the 1950s, facing the fact that industrial facilities 
were destroyed in the war and unemployment rate was very high, Japan chose textile and other labor-intensive 
sectors as the starting point of industrialization. In the 1960s when labor shortage gradually appeared and labor 
cost was rising, labor-intensive sectors lost their comparative advantages in Japan, so capital-intensive heavy and 
chemical industries became the leading sectors in Japan’s economy. But lack of natural resources forced Japan 
economy to be dependent upon import of oil and other materials necessary for these industries. In the 1970s when 
oil price increased dramatically, heavy and chemical industries lost comparative advantages and Japan turned to 
capital-intensive and assembly-based auto industry to lead the economic growth. In the 1980s, Japan became one 
of the richest nations in the world in terms of income per capita. Then R&D- intensive electronic industries grew 
into the leading sectors in Japan economy. For detailed discussion about the path of Japan’s industrial upgrading, 
please see Ozawa(2005). Ju, Lin and Wang (2009) provide a formal model to the hypothesis that the change of 
optimal industrial structure in an economy is endogenous to the change of endowment structure in an economy. 17 
 
At the micro-economic level, the profitability of a firm is affected by the ability of firm 
managers in operating and managing the firm, but more primarily, a firm must be viable in the 
first place
1. The viability of a firm is determined by the consistency of the firm’s technology 
and industry choices with the comparative advantages of the economy. In an open market 
economy without policy distortions, firms operating in industries consistent with comparative 
advantages of the economy will be more competitive and more profitable. As we discussed in 
the last subsection, firms operating in different industries show different characteristics in 
terms of firm size and risk. Therefore, the endowment structure of a country at each stage of 
economic development constitutes the fundamental determinant of firms’ characteristics that 
are relevant for the choice of financing at that stage.   
 
The key characteristic endowment structure of developing countries is the relative abundance 
of unskilled labor and scarcity of capital. In these countries labor-intensive industries and the 
labor-intensive sections of capital-intensive industries have comparative advantages and 
dominate the economy
2. In the context of global economy, most industries consistent with 
comparative advantages of developing countries also exist or have ever existed in some 
advanced countries. Thus the industries, products, and technologies which are appropriate in 
developing economies are relatively mature. Firms in these countries can improve 
technologies and achieve industrial upgrading by introducing and imitating technologies from 
advanced economies
3. So they face little technological innovation risk and product innovation 
risk, and entrepreneurship risk composes the major risk ingredient
4. With respect to firm size, 
firms in labor-intensive industries are usually smaller, especially in terms of capital, compared 
to firms in capital-intensive industries.
5. Therefore, the efficiency of the financial system in 
                                                        
1    The concept of “viability” of firms is first proposed and defined by Lin (2003). A firm is viable if the firm with 
normal management is able to make socially acceptable normal profits in an open and competitive market without 
external subsidy from the government or others. Otherwise the firm is nonviable. It can be inferred that if a viable 
firm is not able to make socially acceptable normal profits it must be because of bad management.         
2  The analysis here also applies to developing economies with abundant natural resources. Due to lack of capital, 
these economies usually adopt labor-intensive technologies in most industries. Even in the sector of extraction of 
mineral resources, relatively labor-intensive technologies are often adopted except for those multinational 
corporations from rich countries.   
3  Introduction and imitation of technologies from advanced countries have been one of the crucial factors that 
contributed to the rapid economic growth of Japan and Asian Tigers (Ozawa, 2005, 2006). 
4  Japan’s economic development after WWII followed the “excellent industrial flight map” provided by the U.S., 
U.K., and other advanced economies. And the U.S. market provided stable, mature, and large demand for Japanese 
products which contributed a lot to Japan’ s rapid economic growth in this period(Ozawa, 2005).       
5  Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (2002) , Tybout(2000) , and other empirical studies provide more robust evidence on 18 
 
developing countries depends on its ability to serve the financing needs of labor-intensive 
small,  mature  businesses.       
  
In advanced countries where capital is relatively abundant and labor cost relatively high, their 
economies have comparative advantages in capital-intensive industries and R&D-intensive 
high-tech industries and those industries are dominant in their economies. Although some 
industries existing in these economies are mature industries, advanced countries are on the 
global technology frontier in all sectors. Thus firms in these countries have to rely on R&D 
activities to improve technologies and promote industrial advancement. Consequently these 
firms have to assume high technological innovation risk and product innovation risk in 
addition to entrepreneurship risk. In terms of firm size, firms in capital-intensive industries 
are usually large, especially in terms of capital needs, due to economies of scale
1. Therefore, 
the efficiency of financial system in advanced economies depends on its financial 
arrangements’ ability to serve the large capital needs and diversify risk. 
    
III.3.2 The optimal financial structure 
The basic functions of the financial system are to mobilize and allocate financial resources. An 
efficient financial system should be able to perform the above functions well and minimize 
systemic risks as well. Given the available financial resources at any given time, if a financial 
system can allocate the available financial resources to the efficient firms in the competitive 
sectors of an economy, the economy will be able to produce the largest possible economic 
surplus and the return to capital will be highest. As such the financial resources can be 
mobilized in the next period of time will be the largest and the systemic risk will also be the 
smallest. Therefore, the efficiency of a financial system depends on its ability to allocate 
financial resources to efficient firms in the competitive sectors in an economy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
this observation. According to Ozawa(2005), firms were small in Japan when labor-intensive industries dominated 
in the 1950s. 
1  Schere(1971) reviewed the literature on the significance of large companies in the U.S. economy before and after 
WWII. The basic trend is that large companies had become more significant in the whole economy. One reason 
behind this trend was the rising significance of capital-intensive industries. For example, in 1958, the 10 largest 
manufacturing companies concentrated in steel, chemical, and automobile industries.   19 
 
As discussed earlier, looking at the characteristics of financial arrangements, we find both 
banks and stock markets have their own strengths and drawbacks in facilitating the allocation 
of financial resources from the fund providers to the firms. It is hard to say whether or not a 
bank-based financial system is more efficient than a market-based financial system. However, 
looking from the real economy side, we find that the endowment structure in an economy 
determines its optimal industrial structure and the characteristics of viable firms in the 
industrial structure. As borrowers or security issuers, firms with different size and risk 
characteristics tend to prefer or be limited to certain choices for financing. Therefore, for a 
country at some stage of its economic development, it can be hypothesized that some 
financial structure, compared to other financial structures, will be more efficient in 
performing its allocation function. In other words, there is a certain optimal financial structure 
in a certain stage of development, in which the composition and relative importance of 
available financial institutional arrangements can most efficiently allocate financial resources 
to viable firms in the competitive sectors of the optimal industrial structure determined by its 
endowment structure. If the above hypothesis is correct then the optimal financial structure 
for an advanced economy is likely to be different from that for a developing economy
1.  
  
In advanced countries, where capital is relatively abundant and labor costs relatively high, the 
viable firms applying capital-intensive technologies and in high-tech industries dominate the 
economy.  Firms in capital-intensive industries tend to be of large size and often require a 
larger amount of external finance. These firms also bear higher technological innovation risk 
and product innovation risk. With more standard financial information available, stock 
markets, bond markets, and big banks are the main finance providers to these capital-intensive 
firms. Firms in high-tech industries are often very risky but usually generate higher expected 
returns to investments. Venture capital is often involved in the early stage of these innovative 
firms, but stock markets play a critical role by providing exit options for venture capital and 
                                                        
1  In the real world, the financial structure in a country is also affected by some legal, political, regulation, and 
other factors. Thus the financial structure in different countries at the same stage of economic development may 
not be exactly the same. However, these factors may only have secondary impacts on an economy’s financial 
structure, compared to the impacts of endowment structure and its resulted industrial structure. The discussion of 
optimal financial structure in advanced and developing countries here should be read as a simplified description of 
the basic trend of optimal financial structure. 20 
 
financing further development of these high-tech businesses. Therefore, a financial system 
dominated by stock markets and big banks is arguably more appropriate than a financial 
system dominated by small banks. Of course, there are also numerous labor-intensive small 
businesses in non-tradable sectors which are less significant in terms of value-added in GDP 
in the advanced economies
1. Thus a number of small banks are also needed for serving the 
financing demand of small businesses. However, the amount of funds transacted through 
these small financial institutions would consist of a small share in the whole financial system.         
 
On the contrary, in developing countries with an abundant labor force and relatively scarce 
capital, labor-intensive industries have comparative advantages and are dominant in the 
economy. Businesses in these sectors tend to be smaller and typically require a smaller 
amount of external finance. Usually adopting mature production technologies, these firms 
involve less technological innovation risk and product innovation risk. They are more opaque 
due to lack of standard financial information. Thus screening firms and monitoring firm 
managers are the main concern for external fund providers of these firms. In this economic 
environment, banks, especially small local banks, have more strengths than stock markets. If 
there are no policy and other distortions, the financial system in these economies is likely to 
be characterized by the dominance of banks with small regional banks playing a significant 
role in the banking sector.  Of course, there are some large firms even in labor-intensive 
industries and also those operating in such industries as communication, transportation, and 
other capital-intensive infrastructure industries. Thus a few large banks and financial markets 
serving these large businesses are likely to exist in the financial system.   
 
According to the above hypothesis, the optimal financial structure for any country will be 
dynamic. As the country’s economy develops and capital accumulates and thus its endowment 
structure upgrades, its leading industries will tend to be more capital-intensive and the 
appropriate technology for the economy will approach the world technology frontier. As a 
result, the viable firms will be of larger size and assume more technological innovation risk 
                                                        
1  For instance, firms providing retailing, restaurant , repairing, and other services are usually small even in 
advanced countries. 21 
 
and product innovation risk. The hypothesis predicts that the country’s optimal financial 
structure will gradually evolve from a small bank-dominated regime to a system where big 
banks and financial markets play the leading role
1.      
 
IV.  Development Strategy, Policies, and Departure 
from Optimal Financial Structure 
 
While the hypothesis in the paper argues that the endowment structure of the production factors 
and its resulted industrial structure are the most fundamental force shaping financial structure in 
an economy, there are many other factors affecting the evolution of the financial system and 
financial structure
2 . Among them, the development strategy and resulting policies are 
consequential factors. It is not unusual that an inappropriate development strategy and related 
policies result in distortions of the financial structure and thus cause inefficiency of the financial 
system. There are many possibilities that the financial structure can be adversely affected by 
policies. Here we focus on some types of policy distortions to which poor countries are more 
likely to be prone.     
 
As one of the most crucial institutions in modern society, the government plays a very special role 
in the country’s economic development and the evolution of the financial system. If the 
government adopts a comparative-advantage-following (CAF) development strategy
3, the markets 
will perform the basic function of resource allocation in the economy. Then market prices will 
                                                        
1  Our hypothesis provides a new explanation for differences in financial structure between the Japan-Germany 
model and the U.S.-U.K. model. It is well documented that the bank was more prominent in Japan and Germany   
whereas the financial market was more prominent in U.S and U.K. From Industrial Revolution to the beginning of 
the 20
th century, U.K. had been the most advanced country in the world. The United States has replaced the U.K. to 
be the most advanced country in the world since WWI. The leading industries and technologies in the U.K. and 
then in the United States have been at the world technology frontier. Therefore, financial markets which can 
mobilize huge amount of capital and diversify technological innovation risk and product innovation risk have been 
very active in the two countries’ financial system.    Germany and Japan were on a catching up progress until 
1980s, measured by their per capita income (Maddison, 2006). The leading industries and technologies in Japan 
and Germany were thus inside the world technology frontier before the 1980s. So firms in these two countries 
assumed less risk than their counterparts in the United States and the United Kingdom. Therefore, banks played a 
more important role in Japan and Germany than in the U.S. and the U.K. Naturally, as the Japanese and German 
economies develop, their leading industries and technologies are increasingly closer to the world technology 
frontier. Correspondingly, financial markets are more and more important in Japan and Germany as well, thus their 
financial structure is becoming more similar to that of the U.S. and U.K..       
2  In this regard, the “law and finance” view is very well-accepted. Legal system does affect the functioning of 
financial system. Also, as Rajan and Zinales(2003) point out, political struggles sometimes may affect the 
evolution of financial system.     
3  Please refer to Lin(2003) and Lin(2009) for detailed discussion of development strategy.   22 
 
reflect the relative scarcities of production factors and social preferences. Facing right relative 
prices, economic agents will choose the industries, products, and technologies that are suitable for 
the economic conditions. Then it can be hypothesized that the demand of economic agents for 
financial services will induce the emergence and development of appropriate financial institutional 
arrangements. Consequently, the optimal financial structure that matches the optimal industrial 
structure will form. Of course, the government is not totally passive in this process because 
efficient operation of financial institutions requires a well-functioning legal system, wise 
regulations, and suitable supervision, which are all  responsibilities  of  the  government.     
 
Thanks to the influential work by Shaw (1973) and Mckinnon (1973) and others, it is well-known 
that “financial repression” has existed in many developing countries. The scenario in a 
“financially repressed” economy usually includes policies that restrict entry into the banking 
sector, control over interest rates, or even direct intervention in the allocation of bank loans. With 
these policies, the formal financial system is typically characterized by a primitive banking sector 
dominated by several inefficient big banks. Not only is the total scope of the financial sector 
artificially repressed, but also the financial structure is distorted. As a result, capital, the scarcest 
resource in these economies, is allocated in an extraordinarily inefficient way. Small businesses, 
which have comparative advantages in these economies, get little access to credit and have to rely 
heavily on internal capital or resort to informal channels for external finance. While Shaw (1973) 
and Mckinnon (1973) insightfully capture the phenomenon of financial repression and 
convincingly analyze the detrimental effects of these repressive policies on economic development, 
a further question is why these distortional policies were adopted in the first place. We propose 
that the development strategy adopted by the government is likely to be the main driving force 
leading to these repressive polices and distorted financial system. 
 
If the government’s priority is to promote industries that are inconsistent with the comparative 
advantages endogenously determined by the economy’s endowments, as many developing 
countries practiced in the 1950s to 1970s under the influence of import-substitution strategy 
(Krueger 1992; Lal 1983), it has to use distortional policies so as to channel scarce resources into 
the priority sectors (Lin and Li 2009). As a result, government interventions and consequent 23 
 
repression of the financial system are inevitable. Due to the inertia of institutional change, such 
distorted policies can have a prolonged influence on the evolution of the financial system. China’s 
experience provides a perfect example for this argument. In the 1950s, the factor endowments in 
the Chinese economy were characterized by extreme scarcity of capital and enormous abundance 
of labor. The government, however, decided to adopt an ambitious comparative-advantage-defying 
(CAD) development strategy in which establishment and development of heavy industries took the 
first priority. In order to push the development of heavy industries, which are very 
capital-intensive, the government had to deliberately distort the prices of various products and 
production factors including labor, capital, foreign exchange, etc.; replace the market mechanism 
with a government planning system so as to control the allocation of production factors; 
nationalize private businesses; and collectivize agricultural production with the People’s 
Communes (Lin, Cai, and Li, 2003). In this centrally planned economic regime, banks were 
terminated or merged into the People’s Bank of China, which became the only financial institution 
in the whole economy until the end of 1970s. Although the government’s development strategy for 
the real economy has gradually shifted from a CAD path to the CAF track since the 1980s, reform 
in the financial system has lagged behind. As part of the economic reform, four big state-owned 
banks were established in the early 1980s. A dozen of joint-stock commercial banks were also set 
up in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But interest rates are still under the control of the state and 
domestic entry into the banking sector is rigidly restricted by the government. The market share of 
the four big state-owned banks has slowly declined, but they still hold a dominant position in the 
banking system today. Because of this serious mismatch of financial structure with the optimal 
industrial structure, labor-intensive small businesses have very limited access to formal financial 
credit, which reduces job creation and widens inequality of income distribution in China (Lin and 
L i u   2 0 0 8 ) .                      
 
While the notion that financial repression is harmful to the economy is well accepted both in 
theory and in practice, another type of policy distortion is less likely to be acknowledged. As a 
policy prescription to correct financial repression, financial liberalization has been generously 
prescribed by theorists and exercised by many developing countries. Those repressive policies 
should be reformed. However, if the hypothesis proposed in the paper is correct, then according to 24 
 
the hypothesis, some new, less noticeable policy distortions may be introduced in the process of 
financial liberalization. It has been very common that developing countries are advised to establish 
and develop financial systems similar to the model in the advanced economies. The U.S. financial 
system where financial markets are highly active is often taken as the best model that developing 
countries should follow. This model is often justified by the supposed superiority of financial 
markets. But as the hypothesis in the paper indicates, the optimal financial structure for poor 
countries is likely to be systemically different from that for advanced economies. If the hypothesis 
is correct, imitating the financial model of advanced economies will not lead to improved 
efficiency of the financial system or generate better economic performance in poor countries. Such 
imitation may even result in destructive consequences such as financial crises.         
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
This paper proposes and elaborates a theoretical hypothesis that the optimal financial 
structure in an economy depends on its stage of economic development. Existing studies have 
insightfully analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of various financial institutional 
arrangements in providing financial services, but these studies do not pay enough attention to 
the characteristics of the real sector in the economy and so are unable to assess the relative 
efficiencies of alternative types of financial structure at a country’s different stages of 
development. This paper argues that the structure of factor endowments in a country is the 
most fundamental force determining its optimal financial structure. The main arguments are 
as follows: The factor endowment structure, which is given at a given time and changeable 
over time, determines the optimal industrial structure and its evolution in the economy. Firms 
operating in different industries and applying different technologies have different 
characteristics in terms of firm size and risks. Thus the demand for financial services by the 
real sector in the economy can be systemically affected by the endowment structure and its 
corresponding optimal industrial structure. A financial structure is optimal for a country at 
some stage of economic development only when the characteristics of the financial structure 
match the characteristics of the optimal industrial structure determined by the endowment 
structure in the economy. Since countries at different stages of economic development have 25 
 
different endowment structure and thus optimal industrial structure, no financial structure is 
universally optimal for all countries. But there is a specific financial structure that is optimal 
for a country at a specific stage of economic development. Thus optimal financial structure is 
endogenously determined and also dynamic. As the country’s economy develops and its 
endowment structure updates, its industrial structure and the characteristics of firms in the 
country change, and also the optimal financial structure for the country evolves 
correspondingly.    
 
The general trend of financial structure in the developed and developing countries mentioned 
at the beginning of this paper is consistent with the hypothesis proposed in this paper. 
According to the hypothesis, the financial structure in an economy is endogenous and formed 
through rational choices of economic agents in responding to characteristics of firms in the 
optimal industrial structure determined by factor endowments in the economy. Many political, 
legal, and cultural factors in the society may affect financial development and financial 
structure in some specific ways and at some times, but they may not be the most fundamental 
determinants of financial structure in an economy. 
 
So far the debates about the relationship between financial structure and economic growth in 
the literature neglect the features of the real sector’s demand for financial services. The 
inconsistency between empirical research results and the factual trend of evolution of 
financial structure can probably be attributed to the implicit perspective in the paper. 
According to the hypothesis of optimal financial structure, to evaluate the financial structure 
in one country, the right question to ask is not whether it is similar to the financial structure of 
advanced economies, but whether it is suitable for the industrial structure determined by the 
endowments in this country. There is no one-size-for-all optimal financial structure. Thus it is 
not surprising that discussions of the bank-based vs. market-based financial structure without 
taking into account the characteristics of real economy have not reached an agreement.         
 
We fully realize that the discussion of optimal financial structure in this paper is still very 
primitive. There are some ambiguities and omissions that need to be clarified or completed. In 26 
 
particular, we focus on the substitute side of alternative financial institutional arrangements 
and emphasize their respective advantages and weaknesses, but we do not analyze the 
potential complementary of alternative financial arrangements. In addition, more detailed 
empirical and theoretical research is necessary to finally establish the theory of optimal 
financial structure proposed in this paper
1. With all these shortcomings in mind, we hope that 
this paper provides a new perspective for research on the relationship between financial 
structure  and  economic  development.    
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